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I. INTRODUCTION
International law has traditionally regarded the peoples of the
world as being represented in the international arena by the
governments in de facto control of their respective states. Except
where such governments are imposed by foreign invasion or conduct
themselves in ways inimical to international peace and security,
these governments are conventionally deemed worthy of respect and
protection under international law-in particular, respect regarding
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"1
and protection "from the threat or use of force." 2 The method by
which a government of domestic origin achieves or retains power
has not ordinarily been thought of as a basis for withholding such
protection.
Hans Kelsen described the principle as follows:
[U]nder what circumstances does a national legal order
begin to be valid? The answer given by international law is
that a national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has
become-on the whole-efficacious, and it ceases to be valid
as soon as it loses this efficacy . .
. The Government
brought into power by a revolution or coup d'6tat is, according
to international law, the legitimate government of the state,
3
whose identity is not affected by these events.
As Chief Justice Taft ruled in the Tinoco Arbitration, the domestic
constitutionality of the seizure of power is considered beyond the
scope of international concern:
The issue is not whether the new government assumes power
or conducts its administration under constitutional
limitations established by the people during the incumbency
of the government it has overthrown. The question is, has it
really established itself in such a way that all within its
influence recognize its control, and that there is no opposing
force assuming to be a government in its place? Is it
discharging its functions as a government within its own
4
jurisdiction?

1. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
2. Id. art. 2, S 4.
3. HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 220-21 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
1961).
4. Tinoco Concession Case, (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica) 1 R.I.A.A. 369, 381-82 (1923),
reprintedin 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1924).
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Traditional doctrine thus privileges neither unilateral nor
multilateral armed efforts to unseat a foreign government deemed,
under some set of normative criteria, to be lacking in internal
legitimacy.
The traditional view, however, appears likely to face new
challenges arising from the strengthening of international human
rights norms and the seemingly unprecedented spirit of
international cooperation that have accompanied the end of bipolar
geostrategic and ideological confrontation. On the one hand, liberaldemocratic political values have increased immensely in prestige in
the wake of the collapse of the Communist Party states of Eastern
Europe; 5 on the other hand, dictatorships that, for political or
geostrategic reasons, were once able to count on an automatic
constituency on one or the other side of the bipolar divide suddenly
find themselves vulnerable to broad international disapprobation.
Thus, whereas coups d'6tat and rigged elections were not long ago
considered business-as-usual, today they are candidates for a
concerted international response, not implausibly extending as far
as internationally sanctioned armed intervention. The determined
reaction of the United Nations and the Organization of American
States (OAS) to the September 1991 overthrow of popularly-elected
Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the attendant
discussion within the OAS about the possible use of force to restore
the "legitimate" government, attest to the shift in attitude.
The contemporary version of what I shall term the "illegitimacy
thesis"-the view that force can properly be used to unseat
governments purportedly lacking in internal legitimacy-surfaced in
the 1980s as an argument in support of U.S. intervention in
Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama. Although rejected by the
international community when invoked on behalf of those essentially
unilateral actions-which were widely perceived as having been
taken for partisan advantage-the thesis itself presents an
intellectual challenge that is not completely without resonance in the
history of the U.N. system. Supporters of the thesis can find a
measure of support in at least three areas of U.N. practice:
controversies over governmental credentials, resolutions on selfdetermination issues, and the establishment of an international
5. Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy has highlighted the
point in a typically tendentious fashion:
It has to be remembered that until recently there was a strong feeling
that there was an alternative out there to Western liberal democracy.
There was a belief in a higher form of democracy, one that
emphasized results, equality, that could really achieve things.
Richard Bernstein, New Issues Born from Communism's Death Knell, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1991, at 1, 11.
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human right to political participation.
To be sure, any international effort to pass judgment on a
government's internal legitimacy is fraught with difficulties. Yet, as
the Haitian case attests, some movement in this direction seems to
be the inevitable outgrowth of recent developments. The problem is to
derive from established doctrine guiding principles that will provide
an appropriately limited basis for broad multilateral action.
II. UNILATERAL ASSERTION OF THE ILLEGITIMACY THESIS:
U.S. POLICY IN GRENADA, NICARAGUA, AND PANAMA
All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, T 4
The bipolar superpower confrontation generated two principal
doctrinal challenges to the bar against the use of force. The first, the
so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine," arose as a proposed justification of the
1968 Soviet Bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia. This doctrine stressed
the irreversibility of the "gains of socialism" and the subordination of
national sovereignty to the common interests of the community of
nations. 6 As the governments espousing this theory no longer exist,
one can safely say that the Brezhnev Doctrine, always
overwhelmingly repudiated by the international community, has
been consigned to the ash heap of history.
The same cannot so clearly be said of the second doctrinal
challenge, the "Reagan Doctrine." The end of bipolarity has only
enhanced the position of the United States as a world power and the
prestige of Reagan policies among U.S. policymakers. If anything,
the succeeding administration extended and generalized the
doctrine, particularly the aspect of it that expresses the illegitimacy
thesis. The legal debate initiated by the Reagan Administration thus
remains a vital controversy in the post-bipolar world.
6. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" was rationalized in the following manner:
Just as... a man living in a society cannot be free from the society,
one or another socialist state, staying in a system of other states
composing the socialist community, cannot be free from the common
interests of that community. The sovereignty of each socialist country
cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of socialism, of the
world revolutionary movement.
PravdaArticle JustifyingIntervention in Czechoslovakia, 7 I.L.M. 1323 (1968).
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The Reagan Doctrine did not, on its face, claim the right to use
force against every government deemed to be illegitimate. The
essence of the doctrine was purported to be counterintervention. As
explained by Jeane Kirkpatrick and Allan Gerson, the doctrine
sanctioned the supply of arms and logistical support to existing
insurgencies combating governments that both lacked the consent of
the governed and depended on external supplies of armaments to
maintain themselves in power. 7 Even thus limited, the doctrine
appears directly at odds with settled international law. Indeed, the
United States never sought to defend this principle in its
submissions to the World Court in Nicaraguav. United States.8
In practice, the doctrine extended beyond the limitations
suggested by Kirkpatrick and Gerson. The overlap between
governments the Soviet Bloc supplied and governments the Reagan
Administration despised was almost total, and to characterize the
Administration's support of insurgents in Nicaragua and Angola as
a "counter" to (wholly lawful) Soviet Bloc military assistance at best
begs the "chicken-and-egg" question. It is also far from
straightforward that the insurgencies supported were pre-existing,
especially given the significance of the U.S. role in shaping the
Nicaraguan insurgency. Moreover, although Kirkpatrick and
Gerson defined the doctrine to exclude the direct use of military
force, the Grenada invasion, though predating the supposed
articulation of the doctrine, is widely understood as an exemplar. 9
At the heart of the Reagan Doctrine, and the foundation of its
political appeal, was its articulation of the illegitimacy thesis.
Kirkpatrick and Gerson were unambiguous on this point:

7. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine,Human Rights, and
InternationalLaw, in RIGHT v. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 19,
20 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter RIGHT V. MIGHT].
8. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
[hereinafter Nicaragua v. United States]. Indeed, assertion of this principle in that
forum would have "boomeranged"; Nicaragua would have been able to assert it to
justify the alleged aid to Salvadoran insurgents, which allegation underlay the U.S.
claim of collective self-defense.
9. See Louis Henkin, Use of Force:Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, supranote
7, at 54 n.29.
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Mirroring basic American constitutional principles, the
Reagan Doctrine rests on the claim that legitimate
government depends on the consent of the governed and on
its respect for the rights of citizens. A government is not
legitimate merely because it exists, nor merely because it
has independent rulers. Nazi Germany had a de facto
government headed by Germans; that did not make it
0
legitimate. 1
W. Michael Reisman developed and extended this view in defending
the Bush Administration's invasion of Panama, arguing that the
traditional notion of state sovereignty is an anachronism:
When [the people's] confirmed wishes are ignored by a
local caudillo who either takes power himself or assigns it to
a subordinate he controls, a jurist rooted in the late twentieth
century can hardly say that an invasion by outside forces to
remove the caudillo and install the elected government is a
violation of national sovereignty .

.

. [If cross-border

military actions] displace the usurper and emplace the
people who were freely elected, they can be characterized, in
this particular regard, as a violation of sovereignty only if
one uses the term anachronistically to mean the violation of
some mystical survival of a monarchical right that
supposedly devolves jure gentium on whichever warlord
seizes and holds the presidential palace or if the term is used
in the jurisprudentially bizarre sense to mean that
inanimate territory has political rights that preempt those of
11
its inhabitants.
The "illegitimacy thesis" advanced by these supporters of the
Reagan and Bush policies poses the following challenge to the
conventional interpretation of Article 2(4): the use of force to unseat
an illegitimate government violates neither the state's territorial
integrity (assuming there is no intent to annex all or part of the
country) nor its political independence (assuming there is no intent
to colonize), since it merely liberates the body politic from domination
by thugs whose control has been maintained, in the original version
of this thesis, through an unpopular alliance with a foreign military
power. 12 Rather than violating the purposes of the United Nations,
10. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 7, at 23.
11. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 871 (1990).
12. See Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to
Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 520 (1990); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and SelfDetermination:Construing CharterArticle 2(4), 78 Am. J. INTL L. 642, 644-45 (1984);
but see Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 Am. J. INT'L L.
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such armed intervention, in Reisman's rendition, serves the
organization's higher purposes, the ban on the use of force being a
mere means to "the enhancement of the ongoing right of peoples to
determine their own political destinies."1 3
To be sure, the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
notwithstanding their political rhetoric and the exuberant theorizing
of their sympathizers in the legal community, did not rely on such
sweeping propositions in presenting legal defenses for their actions.
The illegitimacy thesis was asserted as a subsidiary, never a
primary, justification for these actions, and even so it was generally
embedded within less openly provocative contentions. The thesis
nonetheless constituted a significant component of Reagan/Bush
legal argumentation; it was not, to use Clarence Thomas' nowfamous term, mere "amateur political theory."
A. Grenada
The Reagan Administration, along with the Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), in part justified the joint invasion
of Grenada in October 1983 on the ground that the island nation's
British-appointed Governor-General, Sir Paul Scoon, had invited
intervention to restore law and order. The Administration pointed
out that "the invitation of lawful governmental authority constitutes
a recognized basis under international law for foreign states to
provide requested assistance," and argued that Scoon
was the "sole
source of governmental legitimacy on the island." i 4
This contention is consistent with traditional doctrine only to the
extent that it is manifestly inconsistent with the facts. At the time
the invasion was launched, governmental authority in Grenada was
being exercised by the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), which
had overcome successfully (albeit bloodily) all resistance and
possessed full control of the armed forces. The RMC had announced
645, 649 (1984) (characterizing this interpretation as "Orwellian" and pointing out that
"the argument has not found any significant support").
13. Reisman, supranote 12, at 643; see also Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supranote 7, at 25-26

(arguing that the "whole purpose" of the Charter was to promote a world of
democratic, human-rights-respecting, and peace-loving states); but see Schachter,
supra note 12, at 648 (pointing out the "fundamental" nature of the rule against
unilateral recourse to force).
14. Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 200, 203 (1984) (statement of Kenneth W. Dam,
Deputy Secretary of State, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs); see also
Address of Tom Adams in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada, CARIBBEAN
MONTHLY BuLL., Oct. 1983, at 35, 38 (the Prime Minister of Barbados articulating the
same position on behalf of the OECS).
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its assumption of provisional executive and legislative power, had
successfully maintained order for the previous five days through
imposition of a curfew, and had engaged in negotiations with U.S.
officials regarding the security of U.S. nationals. 15 The GovernorGeneral, meanwhile, appears to have been placed under house
arrest; whatever dubious argument can be made for his de jure
authority, 1 6 he was unquestionably without de facto authority. By any
test of effective control, the RMC was the legitimate government of
Grenada.
This would not, of course, be the first time an invading power
predicated its legal justification on patently untrue factual premises.
But in light of the political statements preceding the legal
justifications, that dismissive explanation is implausible. In
President Reagan's words, military action was necessary
to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and

of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada, where
a brutal group of leftist thugs violently seized power, killing
the Prime Minister, three cabinet members, two labor
17
leaders and other civilians including children.

There was no question that the RMC had "seized power"; its power,
however, did not in Reagan's view constitute legitimate authority
because the seizure was a criminal act of thuggery. The RMC had
failed a normative, not a positive, test of legitimacy.
B. Nicaragua
The illegitimacy thesis similarly appears in connection with the
Reagan Administration's indirect intervention in Nicaragua.
Although the sole justification offered before the World Court was
collective self-defenge, it is possible that this argument was taken
even less seriously by the policy's supporters than by its opponents.
The political justifications for the policy consistently emphasized the
15. SCOTT DAVIDSON, GRENADA: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1987).
16. Under the 1979 People's Laws, which superseded the 1973 constitution, the
Governor-General could "perform such functions as the People's Revolutionary
Government may from time to time advise." Id. at 95. That government had been
overthrown and effectively replaced by the RMC, which did not suspend the 1979
constitution. In the absence of a power vacuum, which did not in fact exist, or of
"advice" by the (defunct) PRG or the RMC to elicit intervention, which clearly did not
occur, the Governor-General had no de jure authority to invite the United States or the
OECS to intervene. Id. at 92-101.
17. Text of United States President Ronald Reagan's Announcement of the Invasion of
Grenada, in Documents on the Invasion of Grenada,supra note 14, at 17.
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internal character of the Nicaragua regime, to such an extent that
the Court felt compelled to address arguments beyond the pleadings.
As the Court pointed out, a July 29, 1985, finding of the U.S.
Congress based support for the Contras on alleged Sandinista
breaches of "solemn commitments to the Nicaraguan people, the
United States, and the Organization of American States" regarding
democracy and human rights.' 8 Although "advanced solely in a
political context" and "not advanced as legal arguments," these
contentions prompted the Court to make specific admonitions
against any principle of "ideological intervention" and any unilateral
right of states to use force to compel compliance even with legally
binding "commitments" regarding internal policy. 19
Kirkpatrick and Gerson applied the illegitimacy thesis
straightforwardly to the Nicaragua case, never even mentioning
collective self-defense. In justifying the Contra policy as an
application of the Reagan Doctrine, they stated:
Nicaragua today [1987] has a de facto government headed by
Nicaraguans who were not elected in any competitive sense,
who came to power by armed force, with help, on the basis of
their promise to establish democracy. It is a government that
requires massive foreign military support to maintain its
power and to stop the advance of an indigenous armed
20
resistance.
Particularly interesting, for several reasons, is the contention
that the Nicaraguan Government was "not elected in any competitive
sense." First, the demand for competitive elections is much more
specific than the vague notion of "consent of the governed," and has
sweeping implications as an index of legitimacy, given the number
of governments that facially fail this test. Second, the contention
takes on a special meaning if one considers (as Kirkpatrick and
Gerson mysteriously fail to mention) that six ideologically diverse
opposition parties competed in the 1984 Nicaraguan elections,
holding rallies, participating in radio and television debates, taking
18. Nicaragua v. United States, supranote 8, at 130, 1257.
19. Id. at 134-35, 11 266-68. Judge Schwebel's dissent adopted the Congressional
finding's most legally significant assertion, charging that the Nicaraguan Government,
prior to its installation in 1979, "gave undertakings to the OAS and its Members to
govern in accordance with specified democratic standards and policies[,]... has failed
so to govern, and has so failed deliberately and wilfully, as a matter of State policy." Id.
at 382, 243. Although Judge Schwebel thus disagreed with the Court's determination
that the pledge to the OAS did not rise to the level of a legal undertaking, id. at 132, T
261, he strongly endorsed the Court's holdings that neither the United States nor the
OAS was privileged to use force to compel compliance with such undertakings. Id. at
132-33, 9 262; at 385, 9 249.
20. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 7, at 23.
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out ads in newspapers and on billboards, and winning over a third of
the seats in the legislature. 2 1 Assuming that Kirkpatrick and
Gerson do not intend the crassest of distortions, they apparently
understand being "elected in a competitive sense" as entailing a very
sophisticated (though unelaborated) set of requisites, thus making
the test even more stringent than it appears on its face. Third, and
relatedly, the selective disparagement of the 1984 Nicaraguan
electoral process (compared, say, with that in El Salvador and other
countries that have enjoyed Ambassador Kirkpatrick's sympathies)
suggests that the test is not only stringent, but also highly
susceptible to controversy and too manipulable to be entrusted to an
interested party's unilateral judgment.
C. Panama
The murkiness of the Nicaraguan case contrasts with the clarity
of the Panamanian situation. The widespread agreement among
observers, not only as to the fraudulent character of the 1989
Panamanian elections but also as to the landslide victory of the
opposition Presidential candidate, cast the legitimacy of the Noriega
regime into immediate crisis. Given the verified popular mandate
for a specific alternative government, the Bush Administration was
not bashful about making the restoration of democracy one of the
articulated objectives of the December 1989 invasion. 2 2 Thus, the
United States flatly took the position before the OAS that
a great principle is spreading across the world like wildfire.
That principle, as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that
the people, not governments, are sovereign. This principle
has, in this decade, and especially in this historic year1989-acquired the force of historical necessity ....
Democracy today is synonymous with legitimacy the world
23
over; it is, in short, the universal value of our time.
Whereas the Reagan Doctrine purportedly emphasized
counterintervention and support for indigenous insurgencies, the
Bush Administration, although proffering at least three alternative
justifications, 2 4 appeared to adopt the illegitimacy thesis in its purest
21. See, e.g., LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION, THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
NICARAGUA (1984).
22. See David J. Scheffer, Use ofForce After the Cold War: Panama,Iraq, and the New
World Order,in RIGHT V.MGHT, supra note 7, at 118-19.
23. BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLY No. 1240, PANAMA: A
JUST CAUSE 2 (1990) (statement of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative to
the OAS).
24. The Administration alleged that it sought to protect American lives, to preserve the
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form.
One commentator supportive of the U.S. actions in Grenada and
Panama on illegitimacy thesis grounds has characterized the
invasions as "customary-law-generating . . . milestones along the
path to a new nonstatist conception of international law that changes
previous nonintervention formulas ....
*25 This is a gross
overstatement. The international community overwhelmingly
condemned both actions. 2 6 The Grenada and Panama invasions
were no more "customary-law-generating" than the Soviet Bloc
invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, even Judge
Schwebel's dissenting opinion in Nicaragua v. United States
expressly repudiated any unilateral right to intervene forcibly in
another state's internal affairs, even to compel compliance with
established international legal obligations: "a State may use force
only in response to the lawful injunctions of the United Nations and
of regional organizations acting in conformity with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations, and in individual or collective self27
defense."
Although U.S. invocation of the illegitimacy thesis to support
unilateral uses of force does not itself signify a change in
international law, customary or otherwise, the development of
international sensibilities should not be overlooked. While the
international community formally repudiated such invocation of the
illegitimacy thesis, it not only failed to impose sanctions against the
United States, but continued to look to the United States for
international leadership (especially in the Persian Gulf crisis),
notwithstanding what might have been characterized as America's
irresponsible attitude toward the use of force and its outright
contempt for U.N. and World Court censure of its policies. Moreover,
the Grenada and Panama actions resulted in the formation of
governments that the international community subsequently
integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, and to apprehend a dangerous criminal. The
insubstantiality of these grounds has been widely noted. See Scheffer, supra note 22, at
118-23.
25. D'Amato, supra note 12, at 517; but see Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States
Intervention in Panama Under InternationalLaw, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 503 n.48
(1990) ("The logic of D'Amato's argument would allow George Bush in 1992 to
contend that burglarizing Democratic National Headquarters has become an
acceptable practice since Richard Nixon authorized such action in 1972.")
26. The U.N. General Assembly voted 108 to 9 (with 27 abstentions) to condemn the
invasion of Grenada and 75 to 20 to condemn the invasion of Panama. DAVIDSON,
supra note 15, at 146; Scheffer, supra note 22, at 123. The Organization of American
States (OAS) condemned the invasion of Panama by a vote of 20 to 1 (only the United
States dissenting).
27. Nicaragua v. United States, supranote 8, at 385, 1249.
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recognized. There is no indication that the fates of the Austin-Coard
(RMC) and Noriega regimes were generally viewed as anything
other than a good riddance.
It is the unilateralism of the Grenada and Panama actions that
guaranteed their broad rejection by the international community. No
respected or respectable theory of international law permits a single
state, or a narrow alliance of states (such as the OECS or the
Warsaw Pact), to use force against adversary regimes by unilaterally
determining them to be illegitimate. It is no accident that U.S. and
OECS hostility toward Grenada predated the Austin-Coard putsch,
nor that Noriega's record of despotism predated any U.S. hostility
toward his regime, nor that the Reagan and Bush Administrations
found no difficulty in allying with other Caribbean basin regimes at
least as thug-like and dictatorial as those against which these
Administrations acted. Self-interested (let alone imperialistic)
motivations are seldom stated as public justifications of foreign
policy. As Oscar Schachter has put it, "To make an exception [to
Article 2(4)] for 'higher' values-whether self-rule or justice-would
so dilute the interdiction against force that it could have no
application except in the unlikely case of an announced
aggression." 28 Leaving open the illegitimacy thesis as a basis for
unilateral intervention can only undermine the fragile norms on
which world peace depends.
It does not follow, however, that the illegitimacy thesis is a dead
letter. The international community has not always unquestioningly
accepted regime legitimacy on the basis of the "effective control"
criterion. International practice contains precedents for questioning
a regime's methods of seizing and holding power. In this era of
unprecedented international cooperation and in light of the strong
international reaction to the Haitian situation, these precedents will
inevitably be examined anew to determine whether they may provide
the basis for broad multilateral action, perhaps including the use of
force, against regimes that can clearly be identified as usurpers. The
result may well be some movement, albeit cautious, in the direction
of "a new nonstatist conception of international law that changes
29
previous nonintervention formulas."
28. Oscar Schachter, Is There a Right to Overthrow an Illegitimate Regime?, in LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU
DEVELOPPEMENT: MELANGES MICHEL VIRALLY 423, 427 (A. Pedone 1991).

29. Anthony D'Amato compared anti-intervention norms to the "neutral" approach
that nineteenth-century courts took toward wife-beating, which "served to insulate the
physically stronger marriage partner against any compensatory force that could be
provided by the police." D'Amato, supra note 12, at 517. Present-day jurists, D'Amato
notes, see such categories as "home," "domestic," and "marriage" not as areas beyond
the scope ofjurisdiction, but as areas subject to jurisdiction. Id.
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III. ASSERTIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN THE
UNITED NATIONS CREDENTIAL PROCESS
The United Nations accords governments diplomatic recognition
through a process of credentialing diplomatic representatives. On its
face, denial of diplomatic recognition is far removed from the use of
force. It may be noted, for instance, that the United States has
behaved peacefully toward several governments to which it has
denied diplomatic recognition, while using force against a
Nicaraguan government with which it maintained diplomatic ties.
The history of U.N. credentials controversies is nonetheless
instructive as to the international community's views regarding
regime legitimacy. More importantly, international recognition of
governments may play a decisive role in determining whether the
holder of some putative authority-such as Grenadian GovernorGeneral Scoon, Panamanian President-elect Guillermo Endara, or
Haitian President Aristide-may lawfully invite a foreign state,
regional organization, or the United Nations to intervene with force.
In 1950, the General Assembly passed Resolution 396, stating
that:

Ved P. Nanda, rebutting D'Amato's defense of the Panama invasion, summarily
dismisses the domestic violence analogy:
Unlike spouses who, as citizens of a state, receive benefits from,
submit to and are expected to abide by universally agreed-to
principles of law and morality derived through a democratically
elected legislative process and enforced by an objective justice system
and police force, nations such as Panama and the United States (and
the USSR and Afghanistan) coexist within an international
framework in which legal and moral principles are agreed to on the
basis of mutual respect .... In situations where no consensus obtains,

these equal participants are under constraints to comply with
principles of international law such as nonintervention.
Nanda, supranote 25, at 498 n.24.
Yet, in thus forcefully reasserting the primacy of the state sovereignty principle,
Nanda largely begs the question. The United States, presumably Nanda's paradigmatic
example of a "state" (notwithstanding the bizarre references to "universally agreed-to
principles" and "objective" courts and police), began as a republic of white male
property-holders; the relationships of these "citizens" with their wives, slaves,
employees, customers, etc., were mostly unregulated and often immune from
regulation, as befitted the "mutual respect" that the "equal" white male propertyholders owed one another. And certainly an individual state's treatment of racial
minorities or criminal defendants was not a proper subject of federal intervention.
Whether the international system is capable of an evolution analogous to that of the
U.S. domestic system is problematic, but the issue cannot be resolved simply by
restating it.
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whenever more than one authority claims to be the
government entitled to represent a Member State in the
United Nations and this question becomes the subject of
controversy in the United Nations, the question should be
considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the
Charter and the circumstances of each case .... 30
Two competing drafts of the applicable standard for international
recognition were proposed to be included in the resolution. The first
embodied a totally objective test, effective control being the sole
criterion:
[A] government... should be recognized if that government
exercises effective control and authority over all or nearly
all the national territory, and has the obedience of the bulk of
the population of that territory in such a way that this control,
authority, and obedience appear to be of a permanent
character .... 31
The United States, among other states, rejected the objective test, in
particular because of its implication that continued U.N.
representation of China by the Nationalist regime isolated on
Taiwan could not be sustained. 3 2 A second draft, essentially
embodying the U.S. position, read as follows:
[T]he following should be among the factors to be taken
into consideration in determining any such question:
(i) The extent to which the new authority exercises
effective control over the territory of the Member State
concerned and is generally accepted by the population;
(ii) The willingness of that authority to accept
responsibility f6r the carrying out by the Member State of its
obligations under the Charter;

(iii) The extent to which that authority has been
established through internal processes in the Member
33
State.
It would appear that "generally accepted" was understood in
30. GA Res. 396, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A11775 (1950).

31. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 61, at 6, U.N. Doc. AIAC.38/L.21
(1950).
32. See Note, The United Nations, 28th Session: Cambodia Representation, 15 HARV.
INVL L.J. 495, 505-07 (1974).

33. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 61, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.38fL.45
(1950) (emphasis added).
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terms of acquiescence rather than approval, and that the Charter
"obligations" referred to peace and security rather than to human
rights obligations under Articles 55 and 56. The proposal might thus
be referred to as a modified objective test. Had the language been
adopted, however, it would have left open an argument for normative
appraisals of legitimacy. As it was, neither proposal was ultimately
adopted, thus leaving no firm guidelines for resolving credential
34
contests.
The history of the United Nations has known eight significant
credentials contests involving China, Hungary, Congo (Leopoldville),
Yemen, Cambodia (1973-74 and post-1978), South Africa, and Israel.
The de facto regime was denied credentials in the cases of China
(1950-71), Hungary (1957-63), Cambodia (post-1978) and South Africa
35
(1974), and narrowly prevailed in the case of Cambodia in 1973-74.
Factor (ii) of the 1950 proposed modified objective test has been a
basis for scrutiny of challenged regimes' international behavior. The
United States successfully opposed the transfer of China's seat from
the Nationalist to the Communist government for two decades on the
ground that the latter failed to meet the criteria of Charter Article
4(1), which reserves U.N. membership to "peace-loving States which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these
obligations." 3 6 This anomalous result, attributable to Cold War
power politics, was overturned in 1971.37 A 1982 challenge to Israeli
Government credentials on these grounds, citing violations of U.N.
38
resolutions, was beaten back by the United States and its allies.
Factor (iii) of the 1950 proposal-establishment of authority
through internal processes-was responsible for the refusal to take
action on the Hungarian delegation's credentials for seven years
following that government's 1956 installation by Soviet Bloc troops.
The retention of the Cambodian seat by the "Democratic
Kampuchea" government, despite the passing of effective control of
most of the country to the "People's Republic of Kampuchea"
government installed by the 1978 Vietnamese invasion, may also be
attributed to factor (iii).3 9 Unavailing were efforts by supporters of
People's Kampuchea to spur consideration of the tyrannical nature
34. See Note, supranote 32, at 506-07.
35. SEN. COMM.ON FOREIGN REL., CREDENTIALS CONSIDERATIONS IN THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY: THE PROCESS AND ITS ROLE, S. PRT. No. 143, 98th Cong.,

1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter CREDENTIALS CONSIDERATIONS].
36.Id. at 8.
37. GA Res. 2758, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 2, U.N.Doc. A/8429 (1971).
38. CREDENTIALS CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 18-19.
39. Id. at 9, 15-16.
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of the Democratic Kampuchea regime and the extent of internal
support for the People's Republic. 40 Nonetheless, in the case of the
Yemeni coup of 1962, the bolstering presence of foreign troops and
the continued resistance of royalist forces did not prevent acceptance
of the "republican" government, which was judged to possess
effective control and4 1which experts viewed as being essentially
indigenous in nature.
Internal circumstances were the bases of the challenges to the
Kasa-Vubu Government in Congo (Leopoldville) in 1960, to the
"Khmer Republic" in Cambodia in 1973-74, and to South Africa in
1974. In the Congolese situation, supporters of ex-Prime Minister
Patrice Lumumba, who was dismissed by President Joseph KasaVubu, argued that the replacement government's credentials should
be rejected on grounds of Kasa-Vubu's non-compliance with the
Congolese Constitution. 4 2 The Credentials Committee refused to
consider the issue, ruling that to do so would be "an intervention in
43 The new
the domestic affairs of the Republic of the Congo ....
government's credentials, having been properly signed by the head
of state (Kasa-Vubu), were accepted on this mechanical basis. 4 4 This
decision had special significance because U.N. forces had
intervened, at the request of the former Kasa-Vubu/Lumumba
government, to restore order in the wake of an army mutiny and a
provincial separatist rebellion. These forces ultimately were used to
suppress armed Lumumba partisans who denied the legitimacy of
the new government.
The Cambodian controversy of 1973-74 required a decision
between two competing "governments" that each claimed effective
control. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, overthrown in a March 1970
coup led by General Lon Nol, had immediately established a
government-in-exile and an alliance with communist Khmer Rouge
guerrillas offering armed resistance to the new government. 4 5 Lon
Nol's U.N. delegation nonetheless had been seated initially without
challenge. 46 By 1973, however, facts on the ground had set the stage
for competing claims. The opposition, while conceding the regime's
control of the capital and other major cities, claimed to govern ninety
40. See U.N. GAOR, Credentials Comm., 34th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, at 1-3,
U.N. Doc. A/34/500 (1979).
41. CREDENTIALS CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 10.
42. U.N. GAOR, Credentials Comm., 15th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, 10, U.N.
Doc. A/4578 (1960).

43. Id. 8.
44. Id.
45. Note, supranote 32, at 496-97.
46. CREDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at 11.
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percent of the territory and eighty percent of the population. 47 The
Lon Nol Government sharply contradicted this claim, but did
concede rebel control of four provinces. 48 Each cited its adversary's
dependence on the assistance of foreign troops as a basis for its
49
claim.
More novelly, Sihanouk's supporters in the General Assembly
argued that the coup had been "carried out at the instigation of the
United States by people in its pay,"50 and that credentialing the Lon
Nol government was tantamount to sanctioning foreign intervention
in Cambodia's internal affairs. 5 1 They further argued, without
citing any particular evidence, that the Sihanouk government
genuinely represented the will of the Cambodian people. 5 2 For its
part, the Lon Nol Government charged that Sihanouk was guilty of
high treason by virtue of his calls for rebellion and for assistance by
Vietnamese Communist forces, 5 3 and that he lacked actual
authority over the guerrilla force holding territory within
Cambodia. 54 Lon Nol's General Assembly supporters further argued
that General Assembly consideration of Sihanouk's claims
amounted to improper outside interference in Cambodia's internal
55
affairs.
After deferral of the question for a year, the General Assembly
resolved, by a two-vote margin, to maintain the status quo while
urging a negotiated solution to the conflict. The resolution observed
that, although the Sihanouk government had established authority
over a portion of the country, the Lon Nol Government "still has
56
control over a preponderant number of Cambodian people."
Only in the South African case were credentials denied on the
basis of the internal character of the regime. Through its de jure
violations of one of the U.N. Charter's few unambiguous and broadly
supported norms-racial equality-the South African Government
47. U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2188th plen. mtg. 11 11, 17, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2188 (1973).
48. Id. 85.
49. Id. 9 11, 85.

50. Id. 9 5.
51. See U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2191st plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2191 (1973).
52. U.N. GAOR Credentials Comm., 28th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, addendum pt.
1, TT 4, 5, U.N. Doc. A9179/Add. 1 (1973); U.N. GAOR, Credentials Comm., 29th Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda Item 3, addendum pt. 1, 8, U.N. Doc. A/9779/Add.1 (1974).
53. U.N. Doc. A/PV.2188, supra note 47, 9 81.
54. See U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., 2155th plen. mtg. T 32, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2155 (1973).
55. Letter Dated 24 October 1973 from Permanent Representatives of Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/9254 (1973).
56. GA Res. 3238, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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subjected itself to ever-increasing scrutiny and disapproval from the
General Assembly, embodied in innumerable resolutions, including
refusals to take action on credentials. These measures culminated
in the events of 1973-74.
On December 14, 1973, the General Assembly passed a resolution
declaring
that the South African regime has no right to represent the
people of South Africa and that the liberation movements
recognized by the Organization of African Unity are the
authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of
57
the South African people.
The resolution went on to request
all specialized agencies and other intergovernmental
organizations to deny membership or privileges of
membership to the South African regime and to invite, in
consultation with the Organization of African Unity,
representatives of the liberation movements of the South
African people recognized by that organization to participate
in their meetings .... 58
Citing this resolution, a majority of the Credentials Committee
began in earnest to challenge South African General Assembly
representation the following year. 5 9 Although no competing slate of
representatives was presented, members concluded that the
Government, being a product of racial criteria, represented only a
small fraction of South Africa's population and so could not
legitimately select a delegation to represent the state. 60 Those
challenging the Government's credentials discussed at length the
pattern of systematic de jure electoral discrimination in South
Africa,6 1 apparently unperturbed by the incongruity of this scrutiny
with the Organization's blithe acceptance of non-racial regimes that
equally exclude from participation the vast majority of their
citizenry. The United States was left, vainly, to point out that a
credentials decision on the basis of domestic policies would
constitute a dangerous precedent. 62 The Committee's rejection of the
57. G.A. Res. 3151(G), U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, 11, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
58. Id. 13.
59. U.N. GAOR Credentials Comm., 29th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 3, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9779 (1974).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. 19.
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South African delegation's credentials was overwhelmingly
sustained by the General Assembly, 63 which, after some controversy
as to the legality of its taking action tantamount to suspension of
U.N. membership, excluded the South African delegation from
64
participation in the Assembly.
Although an exceptional case, the denial of the South African
delegation's credentials and the General Assembly's outright
rejection of that regime's legitimacy to represent the people of South
Africa demonstrate that the U.N. concept of legitimacy cannot be
totally dissociated from the concept of popular sovereignty. It is, as
the U.S. representative protested, a dangerous precedent. This
precedent is both topically and conceptually related to a larger area
of U.N. practice surrounding self-determination and colonialism, an
area in which the "effective control" test has given way more
systematically.
IV. "SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES" AND THE
ILLEGITIMACY THESIS
Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter refers to "the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples" as the basis of "friendly
relations among nations," development of which is one of the
enumerated "Purposes" of the United Nations. The concept of selfdetermination is at odds with the "value-neutral" approach inherent
in other areas of international law, for on its face it challenges
effective control as the sole determinant of governmental legitimacy.
As applied in U.N. practice, the doctrine of self-determination has
meant an increasingly hard line against colonialism and its
vestiges, and an emphasis on expressions of popular will regarding
the political status of non-self-governing territories. Within this
limited context, it has pegged regime legitimacy to consent of the
governed.
In Resolution 1514, the General Assembly proclaimed "the
necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism
in all its forms and manifestations" and called for "[i]mmediate
steps [to] be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or
all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to
transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories . . . in
63. G.A. Res. 3206, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974);
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., plen. mtg. $ 175, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2248 (1974) (adopted 98 to 23,
with 14 abstentions).
64. See Note, The GeneralAssembly, 29th Session: The Decredentializationof South
Africa, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 576 (1975); CREDENTIALS CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 35, at
12-15.
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accordance with their freely expressed will and desire .... "65
Resolution 1541 then elaborated that with respect to "a territory
which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or
culturally from the country administering it, . . . administrative,
political, juridical, economic or historical" elements may be
considered to determine whether "they affect the relationship
between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a
manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a position or status of
subordination. .. *"66 Principle VI of this resolution defined the
realization of self-determination as follows:
A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have
reached a full measure of self-government by:
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or
67
(c) Integration with an independent State.

Resolution 1541 further specified under what circumstances the
alternatives to full independence may legitimately be realized, being
most specific with respect to integration (Principle IX(b)):
The integration should be the result of the freely
expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full
knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having
been expressed through informed and democratic processes,
impartially conducted and based on universal adult
suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems
68
necessary, supervise these processes.
This solicitude for process seems, in actuality, to establish a
presumption in favor of independence in the colonial context rather
than a commitment to participatory principles as such. The World
Court, reviewing the relevant resolutions in its Western Sahara
opinion, implied that plebiscites are an instrumentality rather than
the essence of self-determination:

65. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A14684
(1960).
66: G.A. Res. 1541 (annex), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc.

A/4684 (1960).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 30, Principle IX(b).

Fall 1993]

GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY

The validity of the principle of self-determination,
defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will
of peoples, is not affected by the fact that in certain cases the
General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of
consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. These
instances were based either on the consideration that a
certain population did not constitute a "people" entitled to
self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation
was totally unnecessary, in view of special
69
circumstances.
Judge Ammoun, in his separate opinion, argued for making the
point more explicit by adding to the foregoing paragraph the words
"and in particular the legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign
domination." 70 In the style of vanguardist revolutionary leaderships,
Judge Ammoun asserted, "Nothing could show more clearly the will
for emancipation than the struggle undertaken in common, with the
risks and immense sacrifices it entails. That struggle is more
decisive than a referendum, being absolutely sincere and
authentic." 7 1 This implies a special version of the effective control
doctrine for insurgencies: liberation movements represent
dependent peoples by virtue of their ability to mobilize resistance, and
thereby to establish themselves (by whatever means) as the
alternative source of authority. As the right to self-determination
belongs to "the people"-in the singular, and therefore abstract, sense
of that word-the right does not automatically imply meaningful
participation by the individuals who make up that entity.
Whether infused with participatory values or not, the selfdetermination doctrine raises important challenges to the effective
control doctrine. The United Nations on this basis denied recognition
to Southern Rhodesia, a state of colonial settlers which had declared
independence from Great Britain in order to perpetuate the
disenfranchisement of the indigenous population, despite the
regime's unquestionable control over the territory and population.
Not only did the Security Council call on states to refuse recognition
of the regime, 7 2 it called on the British to "put an end" to the
73
situation, deeming it "a threat to international peace and Security."
On the other hand, the General Assembly recognized the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau under the leadership of the Partido
Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC),
69. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 33 (Oct. 16).
70. Id. at 100.
71.Id.
72. S.C. Res. 216, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1258th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/216 (1965).
73. S.C. Res. 217, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1265th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/217 (1965).
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notwithstanding continuing Portuguese control of the capital and
other major urban centers. 74 At the very least, the presumption in
favor of the established regime that won the day on similar facts in
the 1973-74 Cambodian credentials controversy is reversed where the
principle of self-determination plays a role. This is all the more
remarkable given that recognition of independence during a
continuing state of revolutionary war has the additional consequence
of branding the colonialist resistance as external aggression, leaving
open the possibility of U.N. or unilateral foreign intervention against
75
the "invaders."
Yet the self-determination doctrine has realized even broader
consequences. Having proclaimed that "colonial peoples have the
inherent right to struggle by all necessary means . . . against
colonial Powers," 7 6 the General Assembly announced "its full
support for the armed struggle of the Namibian people under the
77
leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization"
(SWAPO) prior to any plebiscite or to even the formation of a
provisional government that could be recognized. Even more
remarkably, the General Assembly in 1981 called on
Member States, specialized agencies and other
international organizations to render increased and
sustained support and material, financial, military and
other assistance to the South West Africa People's
Organization to enable78 it to intensify its struggle for the
liberation of Namibia.
Thus, the self-determination doctrine trumps Article 2(4), or rather
defines a circumstance in which territorial integrity, political
independence, and the purposes of the United Nations are furthered
rather than impaired by the use of force.
Kirkpatrick and Gerson referred to such resolutions as making
"it open season on any government that can be described as 'alien,
colonialist or racist.' 7 9 They added (without any supporting
authority) that "[i]n principle, any non-Soviet regime can be so
74. Note, UnitedNations, 28th Session: Recognition of Guinea (Bissau), 15 HARV. INVL
L.J. 482,491 (1974).
75. See id. at 489.
76. G.A- Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 28th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 142, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
77. G.A. Res. 34/92 (G), U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1980).
78. G.A. Res. 35/227 (A), U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 48, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1981) (emphasis added).
79. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 7, at 30.
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described," and thus argued that the United States cannot then fairly
be precluded from aiding "groups fighting for democratic selfdetermination" against Soviet-backed regimes.8 0 Yet Kirkpatrick
and Gerson were precisely wrong about the expanse of this doctrine.
As one commentator observed:
There seems to be a general understanding that once the
door is opened to applying the principle to minorities or
"backward peoples" within their territories, practically no
state would be able to escape the disapprobation of the
international community. As a result, there has been a tacit
understanding that no really serious effort will be made to
expand the scope of the principle beyond its application to
colonial peoples. This "conspiracy" against dependent
groups within national territories was in effect even before
the advent of the Afro-Asian states into the international
community, but once in, they have embraced it with great
81
tenacity.
The doctrine remains limited, notwithstanding many recent
successful secessions. 8 2 Still less has the doctrine extended to
mainstream citizens of ordinary dictatorships (whether pro- or antiSoviet), where "self-government" is as effectively denied the
overwhelming majority of the population as in colonial territories.
Nonetheless, a tradition of thought asserting the essence of selfdetermination to be popular participation in government has always
contributed to the doctrine. This tradition, which has been referred
to as the "plebiscite theory" of self-determination, is concerned not
with mere national equality, but with the right of citizens collectively
to decide the issues that affect their lives.8 3 To the extent that this
tradition continues to provide much of the moral force behind the
self-determination doctrine, it might well, in this era of breathtaking
changes, be asked why the principle of self-determination should not
be extended to all citizens living in countries where the established
80. Id. at 30, 33.
81. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW 145-46 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/82, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/659
(1992) (reiterating support for the self-determination principle while referring only to
the traditional anti-colonial and Palestinian causes, with most of the newly independent
states of Eastern Europe and the former USSR abstaining). The seemingly premature
recognition of the independence of states comprising the former Yugoslavia
contradicts prior practice, but no general principle favoring self-determination within
established states seems likely to emerge (as can be seen with respect to the Croatian
and Bosnian Serbs).
83. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 81, at 31, 43.
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human right of political participation is verifiably and flagrantly
violated.
V. THE ILLEGITIMACY THESIS AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
Article 55(c) of the U.N. Charter commits the Organization to the
promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." Under Article 56, "All Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55." Although falling far short of authorizing the use of
force, whether unilateral or multilateral, to compel compliance with
human rights standards, these provisions do make clear that the
pursuit of human rights does not, as such, constitute intervention
"in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"
under Article 2(7).
Among the human rights deemed fit objects of international
concern is the right of political participation. This right was
embodied in Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government
of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
2. Everyone has the right to equal access to public service
in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority

of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
voting procedures. 84
The subsequent International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
contains a watered-down version of this provision:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity...
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
84. Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (A), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948) (emphasis added).
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(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
85
service in his country.
The differences between the two articulations are interesting. It
is not simply that, as Henry Steiner has noted, the "earlier
instrument, influenced to a greater degree than the International
Covenant by the tradition of liberal democracy, gives more emphasis
to the role of the 'will of the people' as the 'basis of the authority of
government.' ' 8 6 The main ideological competitors of liberal
democracy, adherents of one variant or another of Leninist
vanguardism, did not, after all, deny the role of popular will as the
basis of governmental authority; the often-used terms "people's
democracy" and "socialist democracy" were affirmations of fidelity to
this notion, the revolutionary struggle being the ultimate
embodiment of the popular will.
The Declaration's version is more threatening to non-liberal
approaches because it contains, at least arguably, an unwelcome
nexus between elections and governmental authority. As Jorge
Dominguez has summarized the Cuban Government's view,
"[r]evolutionary rule is not legitimated by voting; rather, an election
is legitimated by revolutionary rule."8 7 Article 21 of the Declaration
can be read syllogistically to mean that the basis of governmental
authority is such popular will as has been expressed in the elections,
whereas non-liberal regimes would prefer it to mean that the
popular will is (in some abstract sense) the basis of-and therefore
expressed by-governmental authority, and is also expressed in
elections. The Covenant version simplifies the matter by leaving
undefined the relationship, if any, not only between authority and
88
elections, but also between authority and participation.
Moreover, one can plausibly contend that Article 2(7) of the U.N.
Charter requires that international human rights law disavow any
85. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 55, art. 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
86. Henry J. Steiner, PoliticalParticipationas a Human Right, 1 HARV. Huii. RTs. Y.B.
77, 87 (1988).
87. JORGE DOmINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 298 (1978).

88. It should be recalled that the Covenant embodies a "legal" commitment, whereas
the Declaration was understood as embodying merely a "political" commitment. If the
legal commitment that states have made since 1966 falls short of the political
commitment made in 1948, it is difficult to argue that states should now be held legally
accountable to the greater commitment.
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connection between participation and the power to decide. U.N.
resolutions have consistently implied that the "essence" of domestic
jurisdiction includes "each States's sovereign right freely to choose
and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems,
whether or not they conform to the preferences of other states."8 9 The
international community may, under Articles 55 and 56, promote
state observance of the right of citizens to participate in their
governance, but has no clear authority to mandate a particular
allocation of decision-making power within a sovereign state.
In any event, an election's "genuineness," as referred to by both
participation provisions, has no obvious criteria. Even the more
liberal-democratic Declaration does not require that governments be
elected, as Kirkpatrick and Gerson demanded, "in a competitive
sense." Arguably, genuineness is to be interpreted in accordance
with the diverse ideological frameworks of the signatory states. A
suggested amendment to Article 21 of the Declaration, explicitly
calling for electoral competition among multiple political parties,
was withdrawn when met by Soviet protests that it was "absolutely
irreconcilable with the social structure of certain Member States"
and "in contradiction with the electoral procedures" of the Soviet
Union. 90 The electoral processes in one-party states (or in states like
the former German Democratic Republic, which had multiple
parties responsible for different constituencies but adhering to a
single platform) allowed the citizenry either to select or to ratify the
selection of the most "qualified" individuals to serve; they were not
occasions to revisit the issues decisively resolved by the revolutionary
struggle, nor to debate issues supposedly resolvable by deduction
from that fateful historical decision.
The Communist Party states insisted that elections were only one
aspect of participation, and that their citizens continually took part
directly in decision-making through a variety of mechanisms, such
as nationwide discussions of draft legislation and the quasigovernmental activities of mass organizations. 9 1 These states
claimed their practices to be fully faithful to Article 25 of the
Covenant, yet embedded in a non-liberal context. As East Germany
revealingly submitted, "[t]he essence of socialist democracy consists
in the moulding of society in conformity with the objective laws of
89. G.A. Res. 45/150, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, 1 4, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (1990).
90. Steiner, supra note 86, at 91 (citing U.N. GAOR 3d. Comm., 3d Sess., 133d plen. mtg.
at 11, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.133 (1948); U.N. GAOR 3d. Comm., 3d Sess., 134th plen. mtg.
at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.134 (1948)).
91. See, e.g., the submissions of the GDR, Cuba and the USSR to the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, U.N. Docs E/CN.4/1984112/Add. 1 at 2, E/CN.4/1985/10/Add. 1 at 6
and at 14, respectively.
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development, with guidance by the State and the enlightened and
committed involvement of the majority of the people in that
process." 92 "Enlightened and committed involvement" evidently
meant involvement responsive to "guidance." It is not obvious that
this interpretation of Article 25's requirements contradicted either
the provision's letter or its "spirit," given what had been deliberately
left out by the Covenant's ideologically diverse framers.
Nonetheless, it is a mistake to write off the Declaration and the
Covenant as bases for a participatory norm of governmental
legitimacy. Like the U.S. Constitution, the Declaration and the
Covenant are living documents capable of evolution. What the
Declaration and the Covenant could plausibly have been read to
mean at their inceptions does not dictate what they can plausibly be
read to mean today, or tomorrow. Recent years have seen dramatic,
if uneven, progress toward multi-party electoral structures, not only
in all of Eastern Europe, but throughout Latin America and in
various nations of Asia (Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea),
Sub-Saharan Africa (Namibia, Zambia, haltingly in Nigeria) and
even the Middle East (gradually in Jordan, abortively in Algeria). In
Haiti and Myanmar (but not in Algeria or Nigeria), refusals to heed
electoral results have incurred worldwide opprobrium.
International efforts to end long-raging civil wars in Cambodia,
Angola, and El Salvador have had, as significant components,
mechanisms for fair and competitive elections, and the
Governments of Colombia and Nicaragua have pursued electoral
solutions to civil strife, the latter at the cost of its own demise. The
most important ideological opponents of the equation of popular
participation with multi-party elections have vanished from the
scene, and those that remain have suffered a dramatic loss of
prestige (e.g., China from its massacre of thousands of student
demonstrators, Cuba from its isolation). In short, history has
deprived certain arguments of much of their force. 9 3
U.N. practice, far from lagging behind developments, is at the
cutting edge. In December 1988, the General Assembly called on the
U.N. Human Rights Commission "to consider appropriate ways and
means of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and
genuine elections," albeit "in the context of full respect for the
92. U.N. Doc. ECN.411984/12/Add. 1 at 2.
93. In recent separate articles, Thomas Frank and Gregory Fox argue that the events,
regional agreements, and authoritative pronouncements of the past few years have
fostered the emergence of a determinate and enforceable "right to denicratic
governance." Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
Am. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participationin
InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J. INTL L. 539 (1992). I shall not here attempt to assess the
evidence they cite for this debatable proposition.
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sovereignty of Member States .... ,,94 The result adopted by the
Economic and Social Council in May 1989 was a "framework for
future efforts," the first heading of which was "The will of the people
expressed through periodic and genuine elections as the basis for the
authority of government," a phrase that clears up the abovementioned ambiguity in Article 21 of the Declaration.9 5 The
document included mention of, inter alia, "the right of citizens of a
State to change their governmental system through appropriate
constitutional means," "the right of candidates to put forward their
political views, individually and in co-operation 9with
others," and the
6
need for "independent supervision" of elections.
In December 1990, the General Assembly, with only eight
dissenting votes, declared "that determining the will of the people
requires an electoral process that provides an equal opportunity for
all citizens to become candidates and put forward their political
views, individually and in co-operation with others. . ... 97 It
nonetheless immediately added the words, "as provided in national
constitutions and laws," and further recognized:
that the efforts of the international community to enhance
the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine
elections shall not call into question each State's sovereign
right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems, 9whether
or not they conform
8
to the preferences of other states.
The net result, albeit limited, is a strengthening of the participation
norm.
More concretely, as a result of agreements among contending
forces, the United Nations has become involved in election
monitoring in Haiti, Namibia, Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia.
The mandate accorded the observer mission in the Nicaraguan case
included:

94. G.A. Res. 43/157, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, $ 5, U.N. Doc.
A/43/49 (1988).
95. Report of the Economic and Social Council: Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 12, at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. A/44/454 (1989).
96.Id. at 2.
97. GA Res. 45/150, supranote 89, T 3.
98. Id. 4. A second resolution, passed over the dissenting votes of twenty-nine nations
(mostly Western democracies), reiterated in even stronger terms the norm of
noninterference in national electoral processes. G.A. Res. 45/151, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 49A, at 255 U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990).
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(a) To verify that political parties are equitably
represented in the Supreme Electoral Council and its
subsidiary bodies (nine regional electoral councils and
4,100 electoral boards).
(b) To verify that political parties enjoy complete
freedom of organization and mobilization, without
hindrance or intimidation by anyone.
(c) To verify that all political parties have equitable
access to State television and radio in terms of both the
timing and the length of broadcasts.
99
(d) To verify that electoral rolls are properly drawn up.

Thus, far from merely verifying the honesty of the vote count, the
U.N. mission in Nicaragua undertook to oversee intricate details not
only of the electoral mechanism but of the contextual conditions.
Although the U.N. presence came at the request of a sovereign
government, and could not have been imposed in ordinary
circumstances even under a permissive reading of Article 2(7),
activities of this nature cannot but identify the United Nations with
evolving norms of electoral legitimacy. 100
99. The Situationin CentralAmerica: Threats to InternationalPeace and Security and
Peace Initiative,U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex I, Agenda Item 34, Appendix at 3 U.N.
Doc. A144/375 (1989).
100. Gregory Fox contends that the observer mission standards can be used to interpret
the participation clauses of the international human rights instruments, since,
"[aiccording to [Article 31(1) of] the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
evidence of the 'ordinary meaning' of treaty terms may be derived from sources not
formally linked to a treaty." Fox, supra note 93, at 588. To the argument that U.N.
election monitoring should not be used to interpret treaties because the monitoring
occurs only at the invitation of member states, Fox responds that the monitors'
requirements "consistently match the text" of the treaties and that "many echo holdings
of the U.N. Human Rights Committee" and other interpretive bodies. Id. at 590. He
further contends that "all member states have at some point participated in the
formulation of such standards" as states have had the opportunity to voice objections
before the General Assembly and Security Council. Id.
Fox's argument has some force, but contains a troubling circularity: the mission
standards should be used to interpret human rights law because the standards are an
application of human rights law, and the evidence of their being an application of
human rights law is that they match some interpretation of human rights law. In
reality, not only did the observer teams not purport to enforce human rights law, but
they operated on the basis of state party consent that appears to have been rooted, not
in a sense of legal obligation, but in purely political considerations.
Moreover, it is particularly dubious to argue that the failure of most member states
to object to the observer mission standards constitutes acceptance of those standards as
an interpretation of human rights law. Since the standards have applied only to the
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The reaction to the September 29, 1991 Haitian coup evidences
that the norm of popular participation has come into its own as an
international index of governmental legitimacy, at least where the
international community has already become enmeshed (through
the "observer" function) in domestic processes. Taking the lead was
the Organization of American States, which four months earlier had
resolved to respond to "any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or
irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional
process" in any member state. 10 1 The OAS immediately condemned
the coup as "disregard for the legitimate government of Haiti, which
was constituted by the will of its people freely expressed in a free and
democratic electoral process," and recognized the Aristide
Government's representatives "as the only legitimate
representatives of the Government of Haiti to the organs, agencies,
and entities of the inter-American system," adding that "no
government that may result from this illegal situation will be
accepted."1 0 2 The OAS resolved to recommend diplomatic isolation
and suspension of economic ties, and "to adopt any additional
measure that may be necessary and appropriate to ensure the
immediate reinstatement of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the
10 3
exercise of his legitimate authority."
The OAS position was promptly endorsed by a variety of regional
organizations 10 4 and by a stunning array of speakers before the U.N.
Security Council. The United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba,
Honduras, Cote D'Ivoire, India, France, Belgium, Austria, Yemen,
Romania and even Zaire took to the floor to affirm the sole legitimacy
of the democratically-elected government. 10 5 No one spoke up for the
effective control test. The resulting General Assembly resolution,
adopted without a vote on October 11, 1991, not only condemned "the
attempted illegal replacement of the constitutional President of
Haiti," but declared "unacceptable any entity resulting from that
states being monitored, and those states have consented to the monitoring, other states
would have no occasion to intercede. Indeed, dissenting states would likely understand
such intercession as presumptuous interference in the affairs of the consenting
sovereign state.
101. Representative Democracy, OEA/Ser. P/AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), T I (June 5,
1991). The extent of measures authorized by this "Santiago Commitment" is difficult to

ascertain.
102. U.N. Docs. S/23109, S/23132 (1991).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/23219 (1991) (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group
resolution demanding "the total and immediate restoration of the constitutionally
elected government" and recognizing Aristide's delegates as "the sole legitimate
representatives of the Haitian Government" to the Group's institutions).
105. U.N. Doc. (Press Release) SC/5314 (1991).
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illegal situation."1 06
A new era, it seems, has dawned. However much one might
question its determinacy and its standing vis-a-vis other
international law norms, the right to political participation can no
longer be ignored as a factor in assessing governmental legitimacy.
VI. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL
Despite the traditional strength of the effective control test, recent
developments have demonstrated the viability of the illegitimacy
thesis in the context of broad multilateral consensus. Although in
the past the thesis has prevailed only with respect to "alien, colonial
or racist" regimes, being based on a doctrine of self-determination
rooted in the values of racial and national equality rather than in the
right of popular participation in government, participatory norms
have now developed to the point where one can begin to speak
cautiously about extending the illegitimacy thesis as a basis for the
use of force.
Thus far, the Aristide Government has not issued an invitation
to the OAS or the United Nations to intervene forcibly in Haiti, nor
has it organized an insurgency that might appeal to governments for
arms and logistical support. Its most dramatic accomplishment as a
government-in-exile has been to prompt the Security Council to
recognize certain consequences of the crisis as "threats to
international peace and security," thereby justifying an imposition of
economic sanctions-an extraordinary level of U.N. intervention in a
domestic power struggle. 10 7 At this writing, a test case involving use
of force is not upon us, and may well be averted. Still, one can
conclude from the tenor of the proclamations that, in all likelihood,
fulfillment of requests for armed assistance would not in this case be
deemed a violation of international law. Assuming this is true,
where does it leave the state of the law?
It is dangerous to generalize from the easy case. The Aristide
Government had won an overwhelming victory (sixty-seven percent
of the vote) in internationally monitored elections just nine months
prior to a coup by a military notorious for its history of human rights
abuses, corruption, and disrespect for democratic processes.
Journalistic accounts of conditions within Haiti confirm the
President's continuing popularity. As the elected leadership
remains physically intact, there is no contest over the mandate to
articulate the will of the "legitimate" government. Although the coup
106. GAL Res. 46/7, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991).
107. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res 841 (1993)
(ordering a ban on oil and arms shipments to Haiti and a freeze on Haitian assets).
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leadership has support in the elected legislature and cites human
rights abuses allegedly encouraged by Aristide, its violent conduct
and unsavory history belie any claim to be acting on behalf of
democracy and human rights. Such a set of facts is not likely often to
be replicated.
Still, the demise of effective control as the sole criterion of
legitimacy suggests that a new set of criteria is in order. One set of
U.N. credentials criteria inconclusively offered in 1950 referred to
the "extent to which the new authority . . . is accepted by the
population."1 0 Although "acceptance" was, in the 1950 international
law lexicon, synonymous with acquiescence, reflecting the prevalent
doctrine of that day, acceptance today might mean something
different. The question should not be whether the bulk of the
populace is beyond the regime's control nor whether the citizenry
exhibits (through electoral mechanisms or otherwise) affirmative
support for the leadership, but whether the majority of the
population regards the government as legitimately exercising
governance, rather than engaging in thuggish usurpation.
The idea is not to impose alien values and processes on sovereign
nations, but at the same time not to accept assertions of sovereignty
simply because a ruler has the brute strength to assert it. The
statements by such countries as Zaire and Cuba in affirming the
legitimacy of a non-de facto government suggest that they are
prepared to live by the results of such a test. And their lack of
pluralistic electoral processes should not automatically cause them
to fail it, lest the imperative of political participation become a device
for the deprivation of political independence and self-determination.
"Consent of the governed" takes a variety of forms. 1 09
There are, of course, disparities in the ease of fact-finding.
Where regimes undertake to hold multi-party elections, that
undertaking-as a matter of logic rather than morality-constitutes a
concession that the honestly-determined winner of the elections is
legitimately entitled to hold office, at least until some intervening
event casts the popular mandate into question." 0 The evidence of
108. U.N. Doc. A/AC.38/L.6 (1950). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
109. It should be recalled that the great seventeenth-century theorist of "consent of the
governed," John Locke, denied that the principle prescribed any particular form of
government. Majority support (however manifested) could as readily validate
monarchy as democracy, provided that the regime satisfied the purposes for which the
people consented to live under government. See John Locke, An Essay Concerningthe
True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government (Ch. X, T 132-33), in TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 265, 354-55 (Peter Laslett ed., 1992).
110. Serious questions are likely to arise when controversial events occur between the
election and the overthrow of the elected government. An elected government might,
for example, violate the constitution, commit human rights abuses, betray the platform
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illegitimacy of a coup in such circumstances is nearly irrefutable.
This logic, it will be objected, disproportionately disadvantages
dictatorial authorities who hold elections and then negate their
results, like the Haitian military, the leadership of Myanmar, and
the Noriega regime, without penalizing authorities that refuse
pluralistic elections altogether, such as the Chinese or the Saudis.
Yet even a regime that on principle eschews such elections may
engage in conduct that breaks the link to an established source of
legitimacy, without forging any evident link to a new source. Where,
as in Grenada in 1983, an observably popular, if not competitively
elected, leader is deposed and then, along with large numbers of his
supporters, mercilessly assassinated by a regime with no visible
popular support or other credible basis for establishing rule, a good
case can be made in the international community, barring
ideological and geostrategic polarization, that, even in the absence of
a usurped electoral mandate, recognition should be withheld and
intervention of some sort considered.
In practice, most controversies as to governmental legitimacy
are replete with complexity and ambiguity. Popular will, even if said
to be the sole criterion, operates at more than one level; it may be
articulated variously by the President, the Legislature, the
Constitution, time-honored traditions, mass demonstrations and
much else. A consensus judgment of usurpation will, of necessity,
be the exceptional case, as it should be if one takes seriously the
notions of self-determination and national equality. But recent
experience demonstrates that clear cases do occur.
To the extent that a broad international consensus can be
maintained, the option of multilateral use of force to remove an
illegitimate regime, whatever the prudential considerations, should
not be excluded as unlawful. Although the illegitimacy thesis
presents overwhelming dangers in the hands of unilateral actors, to
eschew it definitively in the context of broad multilateral consensus
is to assert a concept of state sovereignty that has indeed become an
anachronism.

on which it was elected, decline precipitously in popularity, or take actions that risk
provoking civil or international war.

